Network Working Group P. Karn
Request for Comments: 2523 Qualcomm
Category: Experimental W. Simpson
DayDreamer
March 1999
Photuris: Extended Schemes and Attributes
Status of this Memo
This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). Copyright (C) Philip Karn
and William Allen Simpson (1994-1999). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
Photuris is a session-key management protocol. Extensible Exchange-
Schemes are provided to enable future implementation changes without
affecting the basic protocol.
Additional authentication attributes are included for use with the IP
Authentication Header (AH) or the IP Encapsulating Security Protocol
(ESP).
Additional confidentiality attributes are included for use with ESP.
Table of Contents
1. Additional Exchange-Schemes ........................... 1
2. Additional Key-Generation-Function .................... 5
2.1 SHA1 Hash ....................................... 5
3. Additional Privacy-Methods ............................ 5
3.1 DES-CBC over Mask ............................... 5
3.2 DES-EDE3-CBC over Mask .......................... 6
4. Additional Validity-Method ............................ 6
4.1 SHA1-IPMAC Check ................................ 6
5. Additional Attributes ................................. 7
5.1 SHA1-IPMAC ...................................... 7
5.1.1 Symmetric Identification ........................ 8
5.1.2 Authentication .................................. 9
5.2 RIPEMD-160-IPMAC ................................ 9
5.2.1 Symmetric Identification ........................ 10
5.2.2 Authentication .................................. 11
5.3 DES-CBC ......................................... 11
5.4 Invert (Decryption/Encryption) .................. 12
5.5 XOR Whitening ................................... 13
APPENDICES ................................................... 15
A. Exchange-Scheme Selection ............................. 15
A.1 Responder ....................................... 15
A.2 Initiator ....................................... 15
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ...................................... 16
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................. 16
REFERENCES ................................................... 17
CONTACTS ..................................................... 18
COPYRIGHT .................................................... 19
1. Additional Exchange-Schemes
The packet format and basic facilities are already defined for
Photuris [RFC-2522].
These optional Exchange-Schemes are specified separately, and no
single implementation is expected to support all of them.
This document defines the following values:
(3) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a recommended
generator (g) of 3. When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero,
the modulus is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes.
An Exchange-Scheme Size of zero is invalid.
Key-Generation-Function "MD5 Hash"
Privacy-Method "Simple Masking"
Validity-Method "MD5-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
64-bits of cryptographic strength.
(4) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a recommended
generator (g) of 2. When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero,
the modulus is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes.
When the Exchange-Scheme Size field is zero, includes by
reference all of the moduli specified in the list of Offered-
Schemes for Scheme #2.
Key-Generation-Function "MD5 Hash"
Privacy-Method "DES-CBC over Mask"
Validity-Method "MD5-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
64-bits of cryptographic strength.
(5) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a recommended
generator (g) of 5. When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero,
the modulus is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes.
An Exchange-Scheme Size of zero is invalid.
Key-Generation-Function "MD5 Hash"
Privacy-Method "Simple Masking"
Validity-Method "MD5-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
64-bits of cryptographic strength.
(6) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a recommended
generator (g) of 3. When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero,
the modulus is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes.
When the Exchange-Scheme Size field is zero, includes by
reference all of the moduli specified in the list of Offered-
Schemes for Scheme #3.
Key-Generation-Function "MD5 Hash"
Privacy-Method "DES-CBC over Mask"
Validity-Method "MD5-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
64-bits of cryptographic strength.
(7) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a variable
generator (g). When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero, the
pair [g,p] is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes. Each is encoded in a separate
Variable Precision Integer (VPI). The generator VPI is
followed by (concatenated to) the modulus VPI, and the result
is nested inside the Exchange-Scheme Value field.
An Exchange-Scheme Size of zero is invalid.
Key-Generation-Function "MD5 Hash"
Privacy-Method "Simple Masking"
Validity-Method "MD5-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
64-bits of cryptographic strength.
When more than one modulus is specified for a given kind of
Scheme, the Size of the modulus MUST be unique, independent of
the Size of the generator.
(8) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a recommended
generator (g) of 2. When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero,
the modulus is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes.
When the Exchange-Scheme Size field is zero, includes by
reference all of the moduli specified in the list of Offered-
Schemes for Schemes #2 and #4.
Key-Generation-Function "SHA1 Hash"
Privacy-Method "DES-EDE3-CBC over Mask"
Validity-Method "SHA1-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
112-bits of cryptographic strength.
(10) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a recommended
generator (g) of 5. When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero,
the modulus is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes.
When the Exchange-Scheme Size field is zero, includes by
reference all of the moduli specified in the list of Offered-
Schemes for Scheme #5.
Key-Generation-Function "MD5 Hash"
Privacy-Method "DES-CBC over Mask"
Validity-Method "MD5-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
64-bits of cryptographic strength.
(12) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a recommended
generator (g) of 3. When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero,
the modulus is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes.
When the Exchange-Scheme Size field is zero, includes by
reference all of the moduli specified in the list of Offered-
Schemes for Schemes #3 and #6.
Key-Generation-Function "SHA1 Hash"
Privacy-Method "DES-EDE3-CBC over Mask"
Validity-Method "SHA1-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
112-bits of cryptographic strength.
(14) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a variable
generator (g). When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero, the
pair [g,p] is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes. Each is encoded in a separate
Variable Precision Integer (VPI). The generator VPI is
followed by (concatenated to) the modulus VPI, and the result
is nested inside the Exchange-Scheme Value field.
When the Exchange-Scheme Size field is zero, includes by
reference all of the moduli specified in the list of Offered-
Schemes for Scheme #7.
Key-Generation-Function "MD5 Hash"
Privacy-Method "DES-CBC over Mask"
Validity-Method "MD5-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
64-bits of cryptographic strength.
When more than one modulus is specified for a given kind of
Scheme, the Size of the modulus MUST be unique, independent of
the Size of the generator.
(20) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a recommended
generator (g) of 5. When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero,
the modulus is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes.
When the Exchange-Scheme Size field is zero, includes by
reference all of the moduli specified in the list of Offered-
Schemes for Schemes #5 and #10.
Key-Generation-Function "SHA1 Hash"
Privacy-Method "DES-EDE3-CBC over Mask"
Validity-Method "SHA1-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
112-bits of cryptographic strength.
(28) Implementation Optional. Any modulus (p) with a variable
generator (g). When the Exchange-Scheme Size is non-zero, the
pair [g,p] is contained in the Exchange-Scheme Value field in
the list of Offered-Schemes. Each is encoded in a separate
Variable Precision Integer (VPI). The generator VPI is
followed by (concatenated to) the modulus VPI, and the result
is nested inside the Exchange-Scheme Value field.
When the Exchange-Scheme Size field is zero, includes by
reference all of the moduli specified in the list of Offered-
Schemes for Schemes #7 and #14.
Key-Generation-Function "SHA1 Hash"
Privacy-Method "DES-EDE3-CBC over Mask"
Validity-Method "SHA1-IPMAC Check"
This combination of features requires a modulus with at least
112-bits of cryptographic strength.
When more than one modulus is specified for a given kind of
Scheme, the Size of the modulus MUST be unique, independent of
the Size of the generator.
2. Additional Key-Generation-Function
2.1. SHA1 Hash
SHA1 [FIPS-180-1] is used as a pseudo-random-function for generating
the key(s). The key(s) begin with the most significant bits of the
hash. SHA1 is iterated as needed to generate the requisite length of
key material.
When an individual key does not use all 160-bits of the last hash,
any remaining unused (least significant) bits of the last hash are
discarded. When combined with other uses of key generation for the
same purpose, the next key will begin with a new hash iteration.
3. Additional Privacy-Methods
3.1. DES-CBC over Mask
As described in [RFC-2522] "Privacy-Key Computation", sufficient
privacy-key material is generated to match the message length,
beginning with the next field after the SPI, and including the
Padding. The message is masked by XOR with the privacy-key.
Then, the Key-Generation-Function is iterated to generate a DES key.
The most significant 64-bits (8 bytes) of the generated hash are used
for the privacy-key, and the remainder are discarded. Although
extremely rare, the 64 weak, semi-weak, and possibly weak keys
[Schneier95, pages 280-282] are discarded. The Key-Generation-
Function is iterated until a valid key is obtained.
The least significant bit of each key byte is ignored (or set to
parity when the implementation requires).
The 64-bit CBC IV is zero. Message encryption begins with the next
field after the SPI, and continues to the end of the data indicated
by the UDP Length.
3.2. DES-EDE3-CBC over Mask
This is "Triple DES" outer-CBC EDE encryption (and DED decryption)
with three 56-bit keys [KR96].
As described in [RFC-2522] "Privacy-Key Computation", sufficient
privacy-key material is generated to match the message length,
beginning with the next field after the SPI, and including the
Padding. The message is masked by XOR with the privacy-key.
Then, the Key-Generation-Function is iterated (at least) three times
to generate the three DES keys. The most significant 64-bits (8
bytes) of each generated hash are used for each successive privacy-
key, and the remainder are discarded. Each key is examined
sequentially, in the order used for encryption. A key that is
identical to a previous key MUST be discarded. Although extremely
rare, the 64 weak, semi-weak, and possibly weak keys [Schneier95,
pages 280-282] MUST be discarded. The Key-Generation-Function is
iterated until a valid key is obtained before generating the next
key.
In all three keys, the least significant bit of each key byte is
ignored (or set to parity when the implementation requires).
The 64-bit CBC IV is zero. Message encryption begins with the next
field after the SPI, and continues to the end of the data indicated
by the UDP Length.
4. Additional Validity-Method
4.1. SHA1-IPMAC Check
As described in [RFC-2522] "Validity Verification", the Verification
field value is the SHA1 [FIPS-180-1] hash over the concatenation of
SHA1( key, keyfill, data, datafill, key, mdfill )
where the key is the computed verification-key.
The keyfill and datafill use the same pad-with-length technique
defined for mdfill. This padding and length is implicit, and does
not appear in the datagram.
The resulting Verification field is a 160-bit Variable Precision
Integer (22 bytes including Size). When used in calculations, the
Verification data includes both the Size and Value fields.
5. Additional Attributes
The attribute format and basic facilities are already defined for
Photuris [RFC-2522].
These optional attributes are specified separately, and no single
implementation is expected to support all of them.
This document defines the following values:
Use Type
AEI 6 SHA1-IPMAC
AEI 7 RIPEMD-160-IPMAC
E 8 DES-CBC
E 9 Invert (Decryption/Encryption)
E 10 XOR
A AH Attribute-Choice
E ESP Attribute-Choice
I Identity-Choice
X dependent on list location
5.1. SHA1-IPMAC
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attribute | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Attribute 6
Length 0
5.1.1. Symmetric Identification
When selected as an Identity-Choice, the immediately following
Identification field contains an unstructured Variable Precision
Integer. Valid Identifications and symmetric secret-keys are
preconfigured by the parties.
There is no required format or content for the Identification value.
The value may be a number or string of any kind. See [RFC-2522] "Use
of Identification and Secrets" for details.
The symmetric secret-key (as specified) is selected based on the
contents of the Identification field. All implementations MUST
support at least 62 bytes. The selected symmetric secret-key SHOULD
provide at least 80-bits of cryptographic strength.
As described in [RFC-2522] "Identity Verification", the Verification
field value is the SHA1 [FIPS-180-1] hash over the concatenation of:
SHA1( key, keyfill, data, datafill, key, mdfill )
where the key is the computed verification-key.
The keyfill and datafill use the same pad-with-length technique
defined for mdfill. This padding and length is implicit, and does
not appear in the datagram.
The resulting Verification field is a 160-bit Variable Precision
Integer (22 bytes including Size). When used in calculations, the
Verification data includes both the Size and Value fields.
For both [RFC-2522] "Identity Verification" and "Validity
Verification", the verification-key is the SHA1 [FIPS-180-1] hash of
the following concatenated values:
+ the symmetric secret-key,
+ the computed shared-secret.
For [RFC-2522] "Session-Key Computation", the symmetric secret-key is
used directly as the generation-key.
The symmetric secret-key is used in calculations in the same fashion
as [RFC-2522] "MD5-IPMAC Symmetric Identification".
5.1.2. Authentication
May be selected as an AH or ESP Attribute-Choice, pursuant to [RFC-
1852] et sequitur. The selected Exchange-Scheme SHOULD provide at
least 80-bits of cryptographic strength.
As described in [RFC-2522] "Session-Key Computation", the most
significant 384-bits (48 bytes) of the Key-Generation-Function
iterations are used for the key.
Profile:
When negotiated with Photuris, the transform differs slightly from
[RFC-1852].
The form of the authenticated message is:
SHA1( key, keyfill, datagram, datafill, key, mdfill )
where the key is the SPI session-key.
The additional datafill protects against the attack described in
[PO96]. The keyfill and datafill use the same pad-with-length
technique defined for mdfill. This padding and length is
implicit, and does not appear in the datagram.
5.2. RIPEMD-160-IPMAC
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attribute | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Attribute 7
Length 0
5.2.1. Symmetric Identification
When selected as an Identity-Choice, the immediately following
Identification field contains an unstructured Variable Precision
Integer. Valid Identifications and symmetric secret-keys are
preconfigured by the parties.
There is no required format or content for the Identification value.
The value may be a number or string of any kind. See [RFC-2522] "Use
of Identification and Secrets" for details.
The symmetric secret-key (as specified) is selected based on the
contents of the Identification field. All implementations MUST
support at least 62 bytes. The selected symmetric secret-key SHOULD
provide at least 80-bits of cryptographic strength.
As described in [RFC-2522] "Identity Verification", the Verification
field value is the RIPEMD-160 [DBP96] hash over the concatenation of:
RIPEMD160( key, keyfill, data, datafill, key, mdfill )
where the key is the computed verification-key.
The keyfill and datafill use the same pad-with-length technique
defined for mdfill. This padding and length is implicit, and does
not appear in the datagram.
The resulting Verification field is a 160-bit Variable Precision
Integer (22 bytes including Size). When used in calculations, the
Verification data includes both the Size and Value fields.
For both [RFC-2522] "Identity Verification" and "Validity
Verification", the verification-key is the RIPEMD-160 [DBP96] hash of
the following concatenated values:
+ the symmetric secret-key,
+ the computed shared-secret.
For [RFC-2522] "Session-Key Computation", the symmetric secret-key is
used directly as the generation-key.
The symmetric secret-key is used in calculations in the same fashion
as [RFC-2522] "MD5-IPMAC Symmetric Identification".
5.2.2. Authentication
May be selected as an AH or ESP Attribute-Choice. The selected
Exchange-Scheme SHOULD provide at least 80-bits of cryptographic
strength.
As described in [RFC-2522] "Session-Key Computation", the most
significant 384-bits (48 bytes) of the Key-Generation-Function
iterations are used for the key.
Profile:
When negotiated with Photuris, the form of the authenticated
message is:
RIPEMD160( key, keyfill, datagram, datafill, key, mdfill )
where the key is the SPI session-key.
The additional datafill protects against the attack described in
[PO96]. The keyfill and datafill use the same pad-with-length
technique defined for mdfill. This padding and length is
implicit, and does not appear in the datagram.
5.3. DES-CBC
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attribute | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Attribute 8
Length 0
May be selected as an ESP Attribute-Choice, pursuant to [RFC-1829] et
sequitur. The selected Exchange-Scheme SHOULD provide at least 56-
bits of cryptographic strength.
As described in [RFC-2522] "Session-Key Computation", the most
significant 64-bits (8 bytes) of the Key-Generation iteration are
used for the key, and the remainder are discarded. Although
extremely rare, the 64 weak, semi-weak, and possibly weak keys
[Schneier95, pages 280-282] MUST be discarded. The Key-Generation-
Function is iterated until a valid key is obtained.
The least significant bit of each key byte is ignored (or set to
parity when the implementation requires).
Profile:
When negotiated with Photuris, the transform differs slightly from
[RFC-1829].
The 32-bit Security Parameters Index (SPI) field is followed by a
32-bit Sequence Number (SN).
The 64-bit CBC IV is generated from the 32-bit Security Parameters
Index (SPI) field followed by (concatenated with) the 32-bit
Sequence Number (SN) field. Then, the bit-wise complement of the
32-bit Sequence Number (SN) value is XOR'd with the first 32-bits
(SPI):
(SPI ^ -SN) || SN
The Padding values begin with the value 1, and count up to the
number of padding bytes. For example, if the plaintext length is
41, the padding values are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, plus any
additional obscuring padding.
The PadLength and PayloadType are not appended. Instead, the
PayloadType is indicated by the SPI, as specified by the ESP-
Attributes attribute (#2).
After decryption, if the padding bytes are not the correct
sequential values, then the payload is discarded, and a
"Decryption Failed" error is indicated, as described in [RFC-
2521].
5.4. Invert (Decryption/Encryption)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attribute | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Attribute 9
Length 0
May be selected as an ESP Attribute-Choice, immediately preceding an
encryption choice. This indicates that the following attribute is
inverted from encryption to decryption (or decryption to encryption)
as the attributes are processed.
For example, the combination
"DES-CBC",
"Invert",
"DES-CBC",
"DES-CBC",
indicates "Triple DES" outer-CBC EDE encryption (and DED decryption)
with three keys [KR96] pursuant to [RFC-1851] et sequitur. The
selected Exchange-Scheme SHOULD provide at least 112-bits of
cryptographic strength.
As described in [RFC-2522] "Session-Key Computation", the Key-
Generation-Function is iterated (at least) three times to generate
the three independent keys, in the order used for encryption. The
most significant 64-bits (8 bytes) of each iteration are used for
each successive key, and the remainder are discarded.
Each key is examined sequentially, in the order used for encryption.
A key that is identical to any previous key MUST be discarded. Any
weak keys indicated for the algorithm MUST be discarded. The Key-
Generation-Function is iterated until a valid key is obtained before
generating the next key.
Profile:
When negotiated with Photuris, the "DES-EDE3-CBC" transform
differs slightly from [RFC-1851], in the same fashion as "DES-CBC"
(described earlier).
5.5. XOR Whitening
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attribute | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Attribute 10
Length 0
May be selected as an ESP Attribute-Choice, pursuant to [XEX3] et
sequitur. The combination
"XOR",
"DES-CBC",
"XOR",
indicates "DESX" encryption with three keys [KR96]. The selected
Exchange-Scheme SHOULD provide at least 104-bits of cryptographic
strength.
As described in [RFC-2522] "Session-Key Computation", the Key-
Generation-Function is iterated (at least) three times to generate
the three independent keys, in the order used for encryption. The
most significant bytes of each iteration are used for each successive
key, and the remainder are discarded.
Note that this attribute may appear multiple times in the same ESP
attribute list, both before and after an encryption transform. For
example,
"XOR",
"DES-CBC",
"XOR",
"Invert",
"DES-CBC",
"XOR",
"DES-CBC",
"XOR",
would be one possible combination with Triple DES.
A. Exchange-Scheme Selection
At first glance, there appear to be a large number of exchange-
schemes. In practice, the selection is simple to automate.
Each scheme indicates a needed strength. This strength is based upon
the functions used in protecting the Photuris Exchanges themselves.
Each keyed attribute also indicates a needed strength. This strength
is based upon its cryptographic functions.
Because the usage of these functions is orthogonal, the same strength
value can select an appropriate scheme that meets the needs of both
features.
A.1. Responder
The attributes to be offered to the particular Initiator are
examined. For each level of strength specified, a scheme that meets
or exceeds the requirements is offered.
For example, a Responder offering MD5-IPMAC and SHA1-IPMAC might
offer scheme #2 with a 512-bit modulus and a 1024-bit modulus, and
scheme #4 with a zero Size (indicating moduli of #2).
A.2. Initiator
The strength indicated by the application for the Security
Association, together with the party privacy policy of the system
operator, is used to select from the offered schemes. The strength
indicates the minimal level to be chosen, while the party privacy
policy indicates whether to choose the minimal or maximal level of
available protection.
For example, an application might indicate that it desires 80-bits of
strength. In that case, only the 1024-bit modulus would be
appropriate. The party privacy policy of the system operator would
indicate whether to choose scheme #2 with "Simple Masking" or scheme
#4 with "DES-CBC over Mask".
Alternatively, an application might indicate that it desires 64-bits
of strength. The party privacy policy of the system operator would
indicate whether to choose scheme #2 with the 512-bit modulus, or
scheme #4 with the 1024-bit modulus.
Security Considerations
Provision for multiple generators does not enhance the security of
the Photuris protocol exchange itself. Rather, it provides an
opportunity for novelty of moduli, by allowing more forms of moduli
to be used. An abundance of moduli inhibits a determined attacker
from pre-calculating moduli exchange values, and discourages
dedication of resources for analysis of any particular modulus. That
is, this protects the community of Photuris users.
In addition to preventing various attacks by protecting verification
fields, the masking of the message plaintext before encryption is
intended to obscure the relation of the number of parties and SPIs
active between two IP nodes. The privacy mask dependency on the SPI
and SPILT generates a different initial encrypted block for every SPI
creation message.
This obscurement would be less effective when the SPI and SPILT are
invariant or are not created for a particular exchange direction.
The number of parties could be revealed by the number of exchanges
with differences in the initial encrypted blocks.
Acknowledgements
Phil Karn was principally responsible for the design of party privacy
protection, and provided much of the design rationale text (now
removed to a separate document).
William Simpson was responsible for the packet formats, and
additional Exchange-Schemes, editing and formatting. All such
mistakes are his responsibity.
Use of encryption for privacy protection is also found in the
Station-To-Station authentication protocol [DOW92].
Bart Preneel and Paul C van Oorschot in [PO96] recommended padding
between the data and trailing key when hashing for authentication.
Niels Provos developed the first implementation with multiple schemes
and multiple moduli per scheme (circa July 1997).
Special thanks to the Center for Information Technology Integration
(CITI) for providing computing resources.
References
[DBP96] Dobbertin, H., Bosselaers, A., and Preneel, B., "RIPEMD-
160: a strengthened version of RIPEMD", Fast Software
Encryption, Third International Workshop, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science 1039 (1996), Springer-Verlag, pages
71-82.
See also corrections at
ftp://ftp.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/pub/COSIC/bosselae/ripemd/.
[DOW92] Whitfield Diffie, Paul C van Oorshot, and Michael J
Wiener, "Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges",
Designs, Codes and Cryptography, v 2 pp 107-125, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1992.
[FIPS-180-1]
"Secure Hash Standard", National Institute of Standards
and Technology, U.S. Department Of Commerce, April 1995.
Also known as: 59 Fed Reg 35317 (1994).
[KR96] Kaliski, B., and Robshaw, M., "Multiple Encryption:
Weighing Security and Performance", Dr. Dobbs Journal,
January 1996.
[PO96] Bart Preneel, and Paul C van Oorshot, "On the security of
two MAC algorithms", Advances in Cryptology -- Eurocrypt
'96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1070 (May 1996),
Springer-Verlag, pages 19-32.
[RFC-1829] Karn, P., Metzger, P., Simpson, W., "The ESP DES-CBC
Transform", July 1995.
[RFC-1850] Karn, P., Metzger, P., Simpson, W., "The ESP Triple DES
Transform", September 1995.
[RFC-1851] Metzger, P., Simpson, W., "IP Authentication using Keyed
SHA", September 1995.
[RFC-2521] Karn, P., and Simpson, W., "ICMP Security Failures
Messages", March 1999.
[RFC-2522] Karn, P., and Simpson, W., "Photuris: Session-Key
Management Protocol", March 1999.
[XEX3] Simpson, W., Baldwin, R., "The ESP DES-XEX3-CBC
Transform", Work In Progress, June 1997.
Contacts
Comments about this document should be discussed on the
photuris@adk.gr mailing list.
Questions about this document can also be directed to:
Phil Karn
Qualcomm, Inc.
6455 Lusk Blvd.
San Diego, California 92121-2779
karn@qualcomm.com
karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org (preferred)
William Allen Simpson
DayDreamer
Computer Systems Consulting Services
1384 Fontaine
Madison Heights, Michigan 48071
wsimpson@UMich.edu
wsimpson@GreenDragon.com (preferred)
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). Copyright (C) Philip Karn
and William Allen Simpson (1994-1999). All Rights Reserved.
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